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MECHANICS' LIENS-POTENTIAL PITFALL FOR THE
HOMEOWNER
Kentucky provides persons who furnish labor or materials for the im-
provement of the real property of another with the right to a statutory
lien upon that property-the so-called mechanics' lien-to secure pay-
ment for their services and materials." These statutory provisions in Ken-
tucky are by no means anomalous to the American legal system; all
fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutory or con-
stitutional2 provisions granting the right to a mechanics' lien.3
Statutes establishing mechanics' liens were originally drafted to
prevent unjust enrichment of owners of real property at the expense
of workmen.4 They also encourage building artisans to ply their
trades5 and stimulate construction by facilitating the extension of
credit by suppliers of building materials. 6
These statutes can, however, entrap the unwary owner of real
property, causing him to bear considerable expense or even to forfeit
his property to answer for the shortcomings of contractors or material-
men who fail to pay their suppliers or laborers.1 We shall examine
the inequitable manner in which the statutory right to mechanics'
liens can operate against the small property owner" and suggest how
current statutes might be amended to protect the homeowner.
1 Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 376 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Kentucky's Constitution makes no provision for mechanics' liens.
3 See 58 AM. JuR. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 5 (1970).4 In re Heat 'N' Eat Brands, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Ky. 1959).
5 Egyptian Supply Co. v. Boyd, 117 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1941); In re Heat
'N' Eat Brands, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Ky. 1959); Hodges v. Quire, 174
S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1943).
6 It is interesting to note that the first mechanics' lien law enacted in the
United States was enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland in 1791
at the urging of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who championed
such legislat:on to stimulate and encourage the rapid building of the
City of Washington.
Freeform Pools, Inc. v. Strawbridge Home for Boys, 179 A.2d 683, 685 n.1 (Md.
1962).
7 See Hodges v. Arvidson, 66 S.W. 601 (Ky. 1902), for a classic example of
entrapment. Owners of a lot in Lexington, Kentucky, contracted with a builder to
erect a house on the lot. After the house was completed, the owners paid the
contractor in full. Several months later, materialmen obtained a lien against the
property for the value of materials furnished the contractor, even though the
owners had been unaware that the materialmen had had any claim at the time
they paid their contractor. For a report of more recent (unlitigated) instances of
unwary homeowners allegedly being entrapped by mechanics' liens, see The
Courier-Journal & Times (Louisville), February 18, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 1.
8 The discussion here is limited to mechanics liens against privately owned
real property. KRS ch. 376 also deals with liens against real property affected with
a public interest and against personal property such as automobiles.
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Theory and Operation of the Statutes
Unknown at common law, mechanics' liens are exclusively statu-
tory." The lien attaches to the property interest10 of the owner,
giving rise to a cause of action in rem. 11 While the various state
statutes vary considerably,12 most provide that a mechanics' lien may
attach against the ownership interest only of a person who has con-
tracted or otherwise agreed 13 to have improvements made upon his
property. Once he has so agreed, he may have no control over who
shall contribute labor or materials to the improvement,14 yet all such
contributors acquire the right to a mechanics' lien if they are not paid.
State statutory schemes are commonly divided into two groups,
referred to as the "New York system" and the "Pennsylvania system."15
The distinguishing feature of the New York pattern is that the amount
of the claimant's lien is limited to the amount due the original
contractor from the owner. Multiple lienors are entitled only to a
pro rata share of the amount due.1 Under the Pennsylvania system,
on the other hand, each claimant's lien attaches to the full extent of
the fair value of his contribution, regardless of the state of the account
between the owner and his contractor.17 The resulting liability which
the property may incur under the Pennsylvania system is unlimited.
Under this pattern, payment by the owner of all or part of the contract
price to the original contractor is no defense against the liens of sub-
contractors and materialmen if the contractor has failed to pay these
individuals for their contributions to the improvement.
Kentucky's present mechanics' lien statute s conforms to the Penn-
9 In re Louisville Daily News & Enquirer, 20 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
10 The lien attaches only to the interest in the property held by the person
contracting or consenting to the improvement. Thus an improvement made at the
instances of a lessee will give rise to a lien against the leasehold only and not
against the lessor's interest, unless it can be shown that the lessor consented to
the improvement. Campbell & Summerhays, Inc. v. Greene, 381 S.W.2d 431 (Ky.
1964). The lien may attach to equitable as well as to legal interests. Hines v.
Hollingsworth-Young Hardware Co., 198 S.W. 716 (Ky. 1917).
"1 Powers v. Brewer, 38 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1931).
12 See 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 7 (1970).
13 KRS § 376.010(1) expressly requires that the owner's consent be written.
See Cincinnati Stucco Co. v. North Kentucky Fair, Inc., 291 S.W. 715 (Ky. 1927)
(verbal consent insufficient to give rise to a lien).
14 N.O. Nelson Mfg. Co. v. Mann, 71 S.W. 851 (Ky. 1903); Hodges v.
Arvidson, 66 S.W. 601 (Ky. 1902); Hightower v. Bailey, 56 S.W. 147 (Ky. 1900).
154 AERImCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106F (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 53 Am.
Juna. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 8 (1970); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 105 (1948).16 Nicholas v. Miller, 30 S.E.2d 696 (Va. 1944).
17A. & S. Spengler v. Stiles-Tull Lumber Co., 48 So. 966 (Miss. 1910).
18 KRS § 376.010. The language of this section is substantially the same as
that appearing in Ky. STAT. ANN. § 2463 (Carroll 1930), as amended, KRS §
376.010, which was originally enacted as Ky. AcTs ch. 151 (1893). Mechanics'
lien laws were first enacted in Kentucky for the benefit of various craftsmen
and laborers on a city by city basis. The first of these was enacted for the benefit
of Louisville's materialmen in 1831. Ky. Ars ch. 686 (1831).
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sylvania system, but the most invidious aspect of that system-the
unlimited liability which can accrue to the property-has been modi-
fied by a provision that the aggregate amount of mechanics' liens
which can attach to the property may not exceed the amount of the
original contract price.19 Therefore the maximum amount which the
Kentucky property owner may be forced to pay for an improvement
is twice that for which he originally contracted.20
It is apparent that the application of the laws of mechanics' liens
to a given situation may produce both equitable and inequitable
results, and that the magnitude of inequities may vary depending
upon whether the laws of the jurisdiction are patterned on the New
York or the Pennsylvania system. Preventing the unjust enrichment
of the property owner is achieved under either system, for the owner
must pay at least the amount for which he contracted.21 The protection
afforded subcontractors, laborers and materialmen is complete under
the pure Pennsylvania system and relatively so under Kentucky's
modified version. This protection is consistent with the principle
19 The last sentence of KRS § 376.010(1) reads:
The lien shall not be for a greater amount in the aggregate than the
contract price of the original contractor, and should the aggregate amount
of the liens exceed the price agreed upon between the original contractor
and the owner there shall be a pro rata distribution of the original con-
tract price among the lienholders.2 0 An example may serve to illustrate the differences in the systems. Assume
owner 0 contracts with contractor C for an improvement at an agreed cost of
$2000. C, with or without O's knowledge, subcontracts with X to do the work.
X hires Y a laborer, and obtains lumber from Z, a materialman. After the job is
completed, 0 pays C in full, but C for some reason (insolvency, dishonesty) fails
to pay subcontractor X who in turn is unable to pay laborer Y and materialman Z.
Assume further that the fair value of the contributions made by X, Y and Z
amounts, in the aggregate, to $2500. Given this situation, X, Y and Z will have
remedies which wil vary de pending upon the type statute in effect. Under the
New York system, their liens depend upon the state of the account between 0 and
C, and since 0 owes nothing, they can have no lien. Under the Pennsylvania sys-
tem, the fact that 0 has paidC avails him naught; X, Y and Z may still look to 0's
property as security and if they comply with the procedural technicalities for
placing, perfecting and enforcing theirliens, they will prevail. 0 must pay their
claims in full or their iens will attach to his property, which ma be sold to satisfy
the liens. Under Kentucky's "modified Pennsylvania system," Os payment to C is,
again, no defense to the claims of X, Y and Z. His only protection is the fact that
the liens of X, Y and Z cannot exceed, in the aggregate, $2000-the amount for
which 0 initially contracted with C-and their claims will be adjusted downward
pro rata. Thus 0, having contracted for a $2000 improvement, may end up paying
$2000 under the New York system, $4500 under the Pennsylvania system, and
$4000 in Kentucky.
21 It could, of course, be possible for a contractor to so seriously underbid a
job that the total value of labor and materials furnished would exceed the contract
price. The owner could be unjustly enriched in such a situation for even if the
contractor took nothing for his efforts, the maximum amount of mechanics' and
materialmen's liens for which the owner's property would be liable would be less
than the fair value of the improvement. This state of affairs might be brought
about by a very inefficient contractor or it could result from unexpected inflation
in the cost of materials occurring between the time of the original contract and
the time when the materials were required.
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upon which the Pennsylvania system is based: 'That principle is that
everyone who by his labor or materials has contributed to the preserva-
tion or enhancement of the property of another thereby acquires a
right to compensation."22
The property owner's only effective defense is knowledge of the
law.23 He should be aware, for example, that once he has entered
into an agreement with a building contractor the law of mechanics'
liens confers upon the contractor a broad statutory power of agency
by virtue of which he can appoint additional sub-agents (subcon-
tractors), who in turn can appoint other sub-agents, ad infinitum, all
of whom acquire the right to subject the owner's property to a lien
by contributing labor or materials to the improvement.24 The owner
is powerless to contract in such a manner as to protect himself against
the statutory vesting of the power of agency in his contractor, or in the
subcontractors selected by the contractor.25 It is irrelevant whether
22 Jones v. Hotel Co., 86 F. 370, 374 (6th Cir. 1898). The lengthy opinion in
this case includes an extensive discussion of the statutes and case law of variousjurisdictions in which Pennsylvania type mechanics' lien laws were in effect at the
time.2 3 This was made clear by the Court of Appeals in the first case which chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the present mechanics' lien law. Quoting from a
Minneota case, the court said:
*.. [T]he owner must be held to a knowledge of the existing law on the
subject, and to the presumption that he employed the original contractor
and gave out his work with reference to that law.
Hightower v. Bailey, 56 S.W. 147, 148 (Ky. 1902).
24 The right of lien to subcontractors and materialmen is, by operation of
law, incorporated into and made a part of the owner's contract, as much
as if expressly concluded and written therein.Id.
25 There is a split in authority among the various states as to whether an
owner can free his property of liability for mechanics' liens by inserting a clause
in the contract entered into with his contractor to the effect that the improvement
will be completed free of liens. See 57 Am. Jun. 2d Mechanics Liens § 336 (1970).
Kentucky has no statute which speaks to this point. In the most recent Kentucky
case to consider the question, the Court of Appeals seems clearly to align itself
with the group holding that the owner cannot free himself of liability:
The rule in a substantial number of jurisdictions (which rule we think is
sound) is that an owner who has employed a contractor to construct a
building for him cannot free himself of lien liability by inserting a pro-
vision in the contract that the contractor shall erect the building free of
liens.
V;der a liberal construction the laborers and materialmen should be pro-
tected where the work is done and the materials furnished by contract
with an agent of the owner or by written consent of the owner, notwith-
standing an attempted disclaimer of liability by the owner, even placed
of record.
Campbell & Summerhays, Inc. v. Greene, 381 S.W.2d 531, 532-33 (Ky. 1964).
The peculiar facts in this case should perhaps be noted. The "contract" was not a
contract between the owner and a building contractor, but actually a lease which
by its terms required the lessee to erect a building on the premises "free and clear
of all liens." Subsequent to the start of construction, the lessee defaulted, the lease
was forfeited, and laborers and materialmen filed their liens against the lessor.
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the owner has knowledge of who is contributing labor or material to
the improvement,2 and in the recent case of Campbell & Summerhays,
Inc. v. Greene,27 the Court of Appeals held that the converse is true
as well-the laborer or materialman need not know who the owner is.
Finally, the property owner should be aware that it is the consistent
and announced policy of Kentucky courts to construe mechanics' lien
statutes liberally in favor of lienors .2
What defenses does the property owner have against claimant
subcontractors, materialmen or laborers who unexpectedly surface after
the owner has paid his contractor in full? Within a specified period
following completion of the claimant's contribution, the owner has no
legal defense at all, as evidenced by the case of N.O. Nelson Manu-
facturing Co. v. Mann:29
The owner of the building, in cases like the one involved here, pays
money to his contractor at his peril. It is immaterial whether he
knows of the claim or not. The statute casts upon him the duty,
to the extent of the full contract price of the improvement to be
made, of seeing to it that the materialmen who have furnished
material for the work provided for by the contract are paid.
No payments made by him to his contractor will relieve him of
this duty.30
The claimant who has acquired the right to a mechanics' lien will
lose that right if he does not notify the owner of his claim and his
intention to file a lien within a specified period following the last day
upon which he contributed to the improvement. This period is 75
days for claims of less than $1000 and 120 days if the claim exceeds
$1000.81 The lien itself need not be filed until six months after the last
day on which the claimant ceased to furnish labor or materials for
the improvement.32 Consequently, until the expiration of the notifica-
tion period, the owner has no assurance that his property has not
become subject to a "hidden lien."3 3 His only complete defense against
26N.O. Nelson Mfg. Co. v. Mann, 71 S.W. 851 (Ky. 1903); Hodges v. Arvid-
son, 66 S.W. 601 (Ky. 1902).27881 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. 1964).28See, e.g., Hodges v. Quire, 174 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1943); Ohio Oil Co. v. Smith
Haggard Lumber Co., 156 S.W.2d 111 (1941).
2971 S.W. 851 (Ky. 1903).
3od. at 852.
31 KRS § 376.010(3).32 KRS § 376.080.
33The term "hidden lien" is used in KENTcUKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH Coi-
MISSION, REs FCH REPORT No. 27, STATuoRY LIENS 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as STATUTORY LixNS]:
KRS § 376.010(3) is aimed at the "hidden" liens of those not in privity
with the owner that the owner needs to, but seldom does, know about in
order to work something out with the lienors so as to protect himself.
The problem with our notice" statute is that the notice is not required
to be given soon enough.
[Vol. 62
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hidden liens is to wait out the statutory period before paying anything
to his contractor. Otherwise he pays the contractor at his peril unless
he has somehow determined the identity of all possible mechanics'
lien claimants and has obtained waivers from them. Furthermore, to
be valid an express waiver of the right to assert a mechanics' lien
must be supported by consideration.34
Defenders of Kentucky's mechanics' lien laws point out that the
property owner has the following "defenses": (1) he can contract
only with reputable contractors, (2) he can seek legal advice before
entering into any contract, (3) he may require a payment or per-
formance bond of the contractor."5 While these "defenses" are surely
used by property owners involved in large-scale construction projects
such as shopping centers and apartment complexes, it is submitted that
they are particularly inappropriate for the small homeowners con-
templating the typical home improvement project. No one would
seriously maintain that the homeowner shopping for wall-to-wall
carpeting at the local carpet center should defer signing an order for
the purchase and installation of the carpeting until he has consulted
with an attorney. Nor does the average homeowner have access to the
necessary credit appraisal mechanisms to evaluate the probability that
the carpet dealer will not pay the manufacturer for the carpeting or
the workers for installing it. Insisting that the dealer be bonded will,
as a practical matter, greatly restrict the list of dealerships at which
his order will be accepted.
In actual practice, the typical homeowner, when he contracts for a
minor home improvement, does so in ignorance of the law and at
great potential risk to his property. That he can do so in most cases
without suffering dire consequences is due not to the provisions of the
law but to the fact that the vast majority of American businessmen
and contractors are reputable, honest, and often willing to forego
their legal right to a mechanics' lien in order to preserve the good
will which they enjoy in the community. Unfortunately, this very
climate makes it easier for the financially unsound or disreputable
"fly-by-night" home improvement contractor to entrap the unwary
homeowner. The result may be one of those rare, but by no means non-
existent instances where a homeowner learns to his dismay that a
mechanics' lien is being filed against his property several weeks after
34 McCorkle v. Lawson & Co., 259 S.W.2d 29 (Ky. 1958).
35 These alternatives were stressed by several home improvement contractors,
suppliers and attorneys interviewed during the preparation of this comment, all of
whom were unsympathetic to the unwary homeowner's plight and none of whom
were willing to be quoted. See also Courier-Journal & Times, supra note 7, at § A,
at 28, col. 1.
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he has paid his contractor in full. The question to be considered,
then, is whether it would be worthwhile to modify existing statutes to
provide the protection needed by the small percentage of homeowners
who may be injured.
Justification for Modification of the Law
The foregoing discussion has deliberately focused upon the po-
tential inequities which may result from the application of mechanics'
lien statutes to the individual homeowner. In any consideration given
to possible modification of the statutes, however, one must bear in
mind that mechanics' lien laws also apply to large business organiza-
tions. For the large corporation undertaking a major construction
project, mechanics' liens may be more beneficial than evil. It would
be much more difficult, for example, to finance such large undertakings
were it not for the security offered those who contribute to the com-
pletion of the projects by a statute permitting them to look to the
improved property to secure payment if necessary. 6 Unfortunately,
our mechanics' lien statutes do not differentiate between large and
small property owners; an individual homeowner is charged to the
same extent as the largest corporate owner with serving as the guar-
antor of a contractor's obligations to subcontractors, materialmen and
laborers.
Subcontractors and materialmen are also businessmen, and because
they are active in the construction industry, they can be expected to
be more familiar with mechanics' lien statutes than a typical home-
owner. Moreover, they are in a better position to be aware of the
prime contractor's reliability.
Among potential lienors, laborers are perhaps most deserving of
protection. Since the advent of labor unions, however, laborers are
afforded protection not available to them in 1893 when our present
system of mechanics' liens was enacted. Unions forbid members to
remain on a job when they have not been paid, or even when the
contractor is in arrears in payments to members of other unions or on
other jobs.37 As a result, very few mechanics' liens are filed by laborers.
In view of these factors, it does not seem unrealistic to speak of
re-examining the priorities of protection afforded by the statutes.
Modifications designed to afford greater protection to the individual
homeowner vis-a-vis corporate contractors and suppliers, if found
36 See generally 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106H (A.J. Casner ed.
1952).37 See STATUTORY LmNs 15.
(Vol. 69.
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to be justified, would be consistent with the modem trend toward
enacting consumer protection laws.
The need for modernization has not gone unrecognized; studies of
possible improvements have been undertaken in Kentucky 38 and in
other jurisdictions. 39 Suggested solutions include mandatory licensing
of contractors and subcontractors, mandatory bonding of contractors,
optional bonding of owners as a statutorily authorized alternative to
liability for mechanics' liens, and combinations of all of these. While
some steps have been taken elsewhere in the form of statutory
revisions to provide greater protection to property owners, none have
been taken in Kentucky.40
One explanation for legislative lethargy in this area may be that
most proposals foresee all-inclusive revamping of the entire body of
statutes providing for mechanics' liens. Proposed legislation of this
nature would be certain to encounter opposition from legitimate
vested interests in the construction and supply industries and from
lending institutions.41 Few proponents of change seem willing to
identify individual homeowners as a class separable from the mass
of other property owners who constitute the significant customers of
construction and lending interests, such as governmental entities, pub-
lic utilities, land developers, speculative home builders, and other com-
mercial enterprises large and small.4 2 The inequities of the present
law bear upon the homeowner in a peculiar manner, and unless special
provisions can afford him protection not required by other types of
property owners, his interests will be as little protected under any
revised statutory scheme as they are now.4
38 STATUTORY LiENs is such a study.
39 See, e.g., Cutler & Shapiro, The Maryland Mechanics Lien Law-Its Scope
and Effect, 28 Mn. L. REv. 235 (1968); Stalling, The Need for Special Simplified
Mechanics' Lien Acts Applicable to Home Construction, 5 LAw & CONTENT. PROB.
592 (1938); Comment, The "Forgotten Mar" of Mechanics' Lien Laws-The
Homeowner, 16 HASTINGs L.J. 198 (1964).431nstead, recent amendments to KRS ch. 376 have been designed to further
enhance the position of lienors at the expense of property owners. The 1972
amendments to KRS § 376.010 assure lienors interest on the amount of their liens
from the date of attachment and extend the notification period to 120 days from 90
days on claims exceeding $1000. Enactment of a new section, KRS § 376.135,
provides for a lien on farm corps for service by a custom operator.
41 See generally HANDBOOK OF COMMsISSIONE-RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 150(1943) for a discussion of the opposition to the Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act,
which led to its demise.42 An exception is Stalling, The Need for Special Simplified Mechanics' Lien
Acts Applicable to Home Construction, 5 LAW & CoNTEM. PROB. 592 (1938).43 This is the very shortcoming which obtains in the proposed revision of MRS
ch. 376 contained in STATUTORY LiENs 15-16.
This plan is not complete. It would not provide protection for one whose
improvement is financed out of his cash reserve or out of the proceeds
of a loan not secured by an encumbrance on the property. Where the(Continued on next page)
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Solution Which Might Afford Protection to the Homeowner
The homeowner, as we have seen, is presently charged with knowl-
edge of the law of mechanics' liens with all its complications.44
Whether these complications are necessary to facilitate large con-
struction projects has not been examined. If they are, they must
remain as features of the statutes, but the typical homeowner of today
cannot realistically be said to understand them45 and, in the absence
of special statutory safeguards not needed by more sophisticated
property owners, he will continue to be exposed to potential entrap-
ment. His situation could be improved by relatively simple amend-
ments to existing statutes.
The first and foremost protection which the unsophisticated home-
owner needs is protection against the "hidden liens" which result
when subcontractors, materialmen or artisans acquire the right to a
lien without the knowledge of the owner and without being required
to notify the owner of their claims until long after the improvement
is completed and paid for. Instead of being able to delay notification
of the owner of an impending claim until 75 days after his contribution
is completed (120 days if over $1000), it would be more realistic to
require the potential lienor to notify the owner as soon as reasonably
possible after acquiring the right to rely upon the owner's property
for his payment. Notification should be required before the claimant
enters upon the performance of his contribution, if possible, but in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
work consists of a small alteration the losses would not be great. And in
those relatively few instances where the owner has the cash or credit to
finance an improvement, he is more likely to realize the need to con-
sult an attorney in order to protect himself.
As can be seen from this paragraph, the very individual who needs protection
from the complicated mechanics' lien laws is the one who would not get it under
this proposed revision. If the homeowner's improvement is financed by a loan
which does encumber the property, the lending institution's legal staff will insure
that no mechanics' liens will attach to the property. Where the work consists of a
small operation which the owner can finance himself, however, it is hard to see
how he will be any more likely in the future than at present to realize the need
to consult an attorney before entering into a contract for a small improvement.
To dismiss his plight with a comment that "the losses would not be great" puts the
unwary owner right where he is under existing statutes.4 4 Notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
45 One student writer has offeredg the following explanation for the home-
owner's chronic inability to understand or be aware of mechanics' lien laws:
He is accustomed to purchasing personalty on credit, and realizes that his
automobile or television set can be repossessed only if he should breach
his installment sales contract. He has no reason to believe that he can
lose his entire interest in his land and the house he is building even
though he complies strictly with every fineprint term of his construction
contract.
Comment, The "Forgotten Man" of Mechanics' Lien Laws-The Homeowner, 16
HAI sNcs L.J. 198, 206 (1964).
[Vol. 69
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no event later than ten days following the agreement with the prime
contractor which confers the right. Failure to give timely notification
should negate the right to the lien. If delayed notification serves some
purpose in large construction projects, the early notice requirement
could be made to apply only to improvements to residential property
consisting of no more than one family residence. It certainly should
be no imposition for the subcontractor or laborer to determine whether
he is working on a single family residence. The materialman, who is
charged under existing law with knowledge of exactly the real property
for which he is furnishing materials as a prerequisite to the validity
of his lien,46 and who in most cases will deliver the materials to the
building site, would also not suffer a hardship if required to know
whether the project involves the improvement of a single family
residence.
A possible rewording of Kentucky Revised Statutes § 376.040(3)
[hereinafter referred to as KRS] to afford the needed protection might
be as follows (new words are italicized):
No person who has not contracted directly with the owner
or his agent shall acquire a lien under this section unless he notifies
in writing the owner of the property to be held or his authorized
agent, within seventy-five days on claims amounting to less than
$1000.00 and one hundred twenty days on claims in excess of
$1000.00 after the last item of material or labor is furnished, of
his intention to hold the property liable and the amount for which
he will claim a lien; provided, however, that in all cases where the
property to be held is wholly residential in character and consists
of or provides no more than one family unit, said notice must be
effected within ten days after entering into a contract or agreement
to furnish material or labor. It shall be sufficient to prove that the
notice was mailed to the last known address of the owner of the
property upon which the lien is claimed, or to his duly authorized
agent within the county in which the property to be held liable
is located.
The second potential inequity against which the homeowner should
be protected is the danger that he may have to pay twice the amount
for which he initially contracted. While prompt notification from
potential lienors would serve to put the owner on his guard and cause
him to make inquiries before paying his contractor in the majority of
cases, it would not protect the owner who had paid his contractor
before receiving the notices. Many small home improvement jobs
such as paving a driveway or installing aluminum siding are capable
of completion in a day or two and the contractor may have collected
40 McCorkle v. Lawson & Co., 259 S.W.2d 29 (Ky. 1953).
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from the owner before the ten days have elapsed. To afford the owner
complete protection, KRS § 376.010(1) could be amended so that
mechanics' liens would attach to property consisting of a single family
residence only to the extent of the amount due the contractor from the
owner at the time the owner received notification of the lienor's claim.
In other words, Kentucky should adopt a modified New York system of
mechanics' liens insofar as the property against which the lien at-
taches constitutes property wholly residential in character and con-
sisting of or affording no more than one family unit.47
Possible wording for this amendment might be to add the following
at the end of the last sentence in KRS § 376.010(1) (new words are
italicized):
The lien shall not be for a greater amount in the aggregate than the
contract price of the original contractor, and should the aggregate
amount of the liens exceed the price agreed upon between the
original contractor and the owner there shall be a pro rata dis-
tribution of the original contract price among the lienholders;
provided, however, that in all cases where the property to be held
is wholly residential in character and consists of or provides not
more than one family unit, the lien or liens shall not be for a greater
amount in the aggregate than that due the contractor from the
owner at the time the owner receives the notification provided for
in subsection (3) of this section.
Minnesota has recently enacted amendments to its mechanics' lien
statutes which incorporate essentially the same features as those recom-
mended here.47 It is apparent that the legislature of that state has
recognized the plight of the small property owner and has taken
steps to afford him a degree of protection commensurate with his
present economic status in relation to potential lienors. It is submitted
that the Kentucky General Assembly should at this time look to the
example set by a sister state and re-examine its own mechanics' lien
statutes with a view to effecting modifications necessary to provide a
greater degree of protection for the individual homeowner.48
Robert C. Lindig
47 Ch. 247, [19731 Minn. Sess. Laws (effective July 1, 1974). The Minnesota
Legislature saw fit to set the time limit for notification of the owner by potential
lienors at no later than twenty days following he first day on which labor or
materials are furnished for the improvement. The cut-off point below which
provisions of the New York system are to operate has been set at improvements
constituting four residential units or less if the property is wholly residential in
character, or at 10,000 or less usable square feet of floor space if the property is
not wholly residential.
48 It is interesting to note that, according to the opinion of the Court of
Appeals in Hightower v. Bailey, 56 S.W. 147, 148 (Ky. 1900) the mechanics
lien laws enacted by Kentucky in 1893 were "seemingly copied" rom Minnesota's
statutes of that time.
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